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POST-OWBPA DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
LAW REGARDING WAIVERS TO ADEA
CLAIMS
Litigation involving age discrimination in employment is cur-
rently on the rise.' Individuals over age forty who have been
denied promotions or discharged from their jobs2 are reacting
by filing suits against their employers 3 under the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). 4 To avoid the
expense and burden of ADEA litigation, 5 employers often en-
courage departing employees to release their prospective ADEA
1. See, e.g., John F. Dickinson & F. Damon Kitchen, Employment
Discrimination, Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey, 43 MERCER L. REv. 1125,
1125 (1992). The increased litigation involving age discrimination will arguably
continue at least into the next decade as "baby boomers" reach age 40, the
minimum age covered by the ADEA. In 1986, 37.8% of the American work
force was over the age 40. By the year 2010, individuals over the age 40 will
likely make up over half of the work force. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAiRs,
OLDER AMERICANS iN THE WORKFORCE: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIoNS 6 (1987)
[hereinafter OLDER Am ascANs]. In 1991, almost 50 million people over age
40 were employed in the United States. Randall Samborn, Age Suits Allowed
to Proceed, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at 3, 30 (citing statistics from the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
2. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 4 million employees
over the age 35 and with at least 3 years experience at their jobs were displaced
between 1987 and 1992. Id. This statistic does not include employees who
chose early retirement. Id.
3. For a good discussion of general employee trends regarding the filing
of age discrimination suits, see Robert G. Haas, Note, Waivers Under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Putting the Fair Labor Standards
Act Criteria to Rest, 55 Gno. WASh. L. REV. 382, 382 (1987); Michael Schuster
& Christopher S. Miller, An Empirical Assessment of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 64, 64 (1984).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The ADEA, which
covers individuals over the age of 40, id. § 631, prohibits discrimination on
account of age in several terms and conditions of employment, including
hiring, job retention, and compensation. Id. § 623.
5. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) statistics
show that, independent of settled claims, employers paid a total of $89.6
million between the years 1983 and 1986 as a result of litigation. OLDER
AmERicANs, supra note 1, at 123. In addition, employers spent approximately
$83.2 million on settlements during that time period. Id.
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claims in exchange for increased benefits. 6 These benefits are
attractive to many older workers, who often have inadequate
financial resources to cover their rising expenses. 7
Because neither the ADEA nor its legislative history address
the issue of waivers,8 courts struggled to find a standard to
apply in determining the validity of unsupervised waivers. Most
courts held that waivers were valid if their execution met the
common-law "knowing and voluntary" standard. 9 In 1990, Con-
gress settled the debate over the validity of releases by amending
the ADEA with the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act
(OWBPA).' 0 In Title II of the OWBPA, Congress recognized
the validity of waivers and established strict guidelines for
employers to follow in executing waivers."
In the midst of the debate over the validity of waivers,
employers developed an argument that would prevent employees
from bringing ADEA claims even if the executed release was
invalid. Under the "tender/ratification" argument, employers
claim that an employee ratifies an otherwise invalid release when
the employee brings an ADEA claim without tendering the
consideration to the employer.' 2 The Fourth and Fifth Circuit
6. This Note uses the terms "release" and "waiver" interchangeably,
consistent with treatment by courts and Congress. Waivers are a common
means of resolving potential and actual legal claims. Waivers are commonly
used in the employment context to release Title VII and other claims. See
Robert J. Aalberts & Eileen P. Kelly, Waivers Under the ADEA: An Analysis
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989, 40
LAB. L.J. 739, 739 (1989).
According to a 1989 Government Accounting Office (GAO) study, 80
"Fortune 100" companies utilized some sort of exit incentive program between
1979 and 1988, and approximately 28% of them utilized waivers in conjunction
with their exit incentive programs. Id. at 739-40 (citing U.S. GENERAL Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, AGE DISCRIMINATION: USE OF WAIVERS BY LARGE COMPANIES
OFFERING ExrT INCENTIVES TO EMPLOYEES (1989)). This figure was a significant
increase from the 1984 statistics, which found that 13% of the same companies
utilized waivers. Id. at 740 (citing Downsizing Continues Unabated as Worries
About the Economy Grow, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1989, at 1).
7. Amy Wax, Note, Waiver of Rights Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1067, 1090 (1986) (discussing
the pressure on older workers to accept financial settlements offered by their
employers).
8. See Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1041-43
(6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986).
9. See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
common-law approach to waivers under the ADEA.
10. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990). Title II of the OWBPA,
which governs the validity of waivers, is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (Supp.
IV 1992).
11. Id.; see also infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
12. See infra part II for a discussion of the tender/ratification argument
and the relevant cases.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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Courts of Appeals were the first to address this argument in
the context of age discrimination. Both courts, in decisions prior
to the application of the OWBPA, agreed with the employers
and precluded the employees from proceeding with their ADEA
claims based on the contract doctrine of ratification. 3 The Fifth
Circuit in Wamsley v. Champlin Refining & Chemicals, Inc.'4
recently affirmed its position, this time in a post-OWBPA
decision that discussed why the OWBPA does not effect the
court's rejection of a tender requirement.
Other courts have allowed employees to proceed with ADEA
claims despite their retention of the consideration. Pre-OWBPA
courts that allowed employees to continue with their ADEA
claims without tendering the consideration, including the Elev-
enth Circuit, relied on the policy of the ADEA and its amend-
ments; namely, to protect older workers. 5 Most recently, the
Seventh Circuit in Oberg v. Allied Van Lines 6 rejected the
tender/ratification argument based on the language of the
OWBPA.17
This Note examines the two approaches courts have taken to
the tender/ratification argument. In addition, this Note suggests
practical methods to cope with and avoid the tender/ratification
issue. Part I examines the historical use of waivers under the
ADEA. Part II discusses the federal cases that address the
tender/ratification argument. Part III evaluates these approaches
and concludes that, although neither argument is entirely per-
suasive, policy and congressional intent dictate rejection of the
tender requirement. Part IV focuses on methods for practitioners
to avoid the tender/ratification issue, including adherence to the
OWBPA and a suggestion for Congress to allow employers to
use an escrow account to maintain the consideration until the
statute of limitations expires. Part V discusses other trends in
the law regarding age discrimination releases, focusing on the
use of covenants not to sue in conjunction with ADEA releases.
13. See O'Shea v. Commercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 177 (1991); Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217
(5th Cir. 1991). See also infra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
14. 11 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 1993). See infra notes 91-115 and accompanying
text for a full discussion of Wamsley.
15. See infra notes 54-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
pre-OWBPA cases.
16. 11 F.3d 639 (7th Cir. 1993).
17. According to the court in Oberg, Congress has spoken on the issue,
and the language of the OWBPA precludes any ratification of an invalid
waiver. Id. at 683. See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text for a full
discussion of Oberg.
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I. HISTORY OF ADEA WAIVERS
A. Federal Common Law Approach
Employers often request departing employees to sign releases
in exchange for enhanced severance benefits. Releases are used
both when individual employees are terminated 8 and when
groups of employees are terminated by an employer, usually as
part of a reduction in force (RIF) commenced for economic
reasons. 9 Regardless of the context in which releases are used,
the goal of employers is to avoid the costly litigation of age
discrimination claims, whether meritorious or frivolous.20
Prior to Congress' 1990 response to the issue,2' courts ques-
tioned whether releases to ADEA claims could be valid without
supervision by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).22 Courts and scholars held two competing theories
regarding the validity of unsupervised waivers. First, advocates
of the incorporation theory argued that unsupervised waivers
were per se prohibited.23 These theorists assumed that incorpo-
ration by Congress of certain enforcement provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA)24 into the ADEA indicated that
18. See S. REP. No. 101-263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (minority views),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1564 (describing some situations in
which releases are used in conjunction with individual termination).
19. See generally id. at 1565 (discussing various options for employers
faced with a workforce reduction, including involuntary RIFs and voluntary
early-out incentive programs).
20. It is important to note that employers may ask departing employees
to release ADEA claims regardless of whether the employer violated the
ADEA. In other words, the presence of a release should not imply a violation
of the law.
For any number of reasons, not all companies require releases, at
least in the context of early-out incentive programs. But does that
mean, as some have suggested, that employers who seek releases
do so because they know they are violating the law? Certainly
not. It is not unrealistic, in our view, for a company to at least
try to avoid litigation. Even meritless claims, as we all know, can
represent a substantial financial burden.
Id. at 1565-66.
21. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433,
104 Stat. 978 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(0 (Supp. IV 1992)).
22. The EEOC oversees compliance with the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 626(4)
(1988).
23. Advocates of this theory argued that older workers need the same
protection from their employers as do those workers covered by the FLSA.
See Haas, supra note 3, at 391.
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The FLSA mandates
minimum wages and limits the number of hours employees have to work
without overtime compensation.https://openschola ship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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Congress intended to interpret the two statutes consistently.Y
The FLSA case law consistently holds that wages owed under
the FLSA cannot be waived.2
Advocates of the second theory argued that unsupervised
waivers to ADEA claims were valid if they were "knowing and
voluntary," the standard used to determine the validity of
waivers to Title VII claims.Y Proponents of this theory argued
that the goals and the structure of the two statutes - Title VII
and the ADEA - are so similar that they should be construed
consistently. 23 Because the Supreme Court has upheld waivers
under Title VII as long as they are "knowing and voluntary," 29
consistency requires that the same standard control ADEA waiv-
ers.
The Sixth Circuit was the first court of appeals to provide an
answer to the question regarding congressional intent and un-
supervised ADEA waivers. In Runyan v. NCR Corp.,30 the Sixth
Circuit adopted the Title VII approach and upheld an unsuper-
vised release to an ADEA claim. Several courts subsequently
adopted the approach taken by the Sixth Circuit. 31 In addition,
25. The portion of the ADEA giving rise to this argument reads: "The
provisions of [the ADEA] shall be enforced in accordance with the powers,
remedies, and procedures in [FLSA]." 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
26. See, e.g., D.A. Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 116 (1946)
(holding that unsupervised releases under the FLSA are only valid when they
involve a good faith settlement of bona fide factual disputes, such as the
number of hours worked by an employee).
27. Title VII is part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits
discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, sex, and national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
28. See, e.g., Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (stating that the
ADEA and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 share similar "aims" and "prohibi-
tions"); see also Aalberts & Kelly, supra note 6, at 741.
29. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974) (up-
holding the use of waivers under Title VII if such waivers were knowing and
voluntary).
30. 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986).
The Runyan decision upholding the release was made by the court en banc,
and reversed a previous decision by a panel of Sixth Circuit judges in which
the court decided that the principles of the FLSA should govern releases under
the ADEA. Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 759 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir.
1985).
31. See, e.g., Bormann v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399,
401-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 292 (1989); Cirillo v. Arco Chemical
Co., 862 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1988).
In determining whether a release was "knowing and voluntary," courts
considered a variety of factors. Most adopted the "totality of circumstances"
standard. The most frequently cited case regarding the appropriate factors to
consider is Bormann v. AT & T Communications, Inc., 875 F.2d 399 (2d Cir.
1989), in which the court articulated seven non-exhaustive factors: (1) the
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the EEOC adopted a final regulation in August 1987 that was
consistent with Runyan in upholding the use of unsupervised
waivers to ADEA claims.12 The Runyan case and the EEOC
regulation, which both ignored the FLSA incorporation argu-
ment, prompted a response by Congress on the issue of ADEA
waivers.
B. Congressional Response: The Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990
In 1990, Congress amended the ADEA with the OWBPA. a3
Title 114 of the OWBPA codifies Runyan35 by allowing unsu-
plaintiff's education and business experience; (2) the amount of time the
plaintiff had possession of or access to the agreement prior to signing it; (3)
the role of the plaintiff in deciding the terms of the agreement; (4) the clarity
of the agreement; (5) whether the plaintiff was represented by or consulted
with an attorney; (6) whether the consideration involved exceeded benefits
normally received by the plaintiff; and (7) whether an employer encourages
or discourages an employee to consult with an attorney, and whether the
employee had a fair opportunity to do so. Id. at 403; see also Coventry v.
United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 1988).
The Sixth and the Eighth Circuits, however, elected to apply "ordinary
contract principles" to make this determination. Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick
Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 541 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 928 (1987);
Runyan, 787 F.2d at 1044 n.10.
32. 52 Fed. Reg. 32,293 (1987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1627). The EEOC
decided to address waivers shortly after Runyan because that decision did not
sufficiently address the issue, and there was a fear that "courts may return
to a per se rule against waivers." Aalberts & Kelly, supra note 6, at 741.42.
However, Congress suspended this regulation in various appropriations bills.
See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
33. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990). The OWBPA applies to
all waivers signed after October 16, 1990. The Act is not retroactive, so those
waivers signed prior to the effective date are subject to pre-OWBPA common
law. One commentator noted that the OWBPA "can be hailed as further
proof of a national consensus against age discrimination." Michael C. Harper,
Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA
Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 79 VA. L.
R v. 1271, 1271 (1993).
34. Title II of the OWBPA is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (Supp. IV
1992). Title I of the OWBPA requires employers that reduce employee benefits
based on age to provide older employees with benefits at least equal to those
offered to younger employees. Pub. L. No. 101-433, §§ 101-105, 104 Stat.
978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 630(l) (Supp. IV 1992)). This portion
of the OWBPA overrules the Supreme Court's decision in Public Employees
Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), which exempted employee
benefit plans from ADEA coverage. See generally Paul T. Shultz & Douglas
J. Tormey, Congress Response to Betts: the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act of 1990, 16 Em. Rn. L.J. 533, 533-39 (1991). See also Niall A. Paul,
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act: Forcing a New Look at Early
Retirement Incentives and Waivers, 17 Em,. RLn. L.J. 29, 34 (1991).
35. 787 F.2d 1039 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986). For a
discussion of Runyan, see supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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pervised waivers as long as they are "knowing and voluntary."
However, the OWBPA includes numerous restrictions on the
use of waivers, which arguably reveal the intent of Congress to
make their use unattractive to employers.
36
The OWBPA established seven basic criteria that employers
must meet to make waivers to ADEA claims valid in individual
termination situations. 37 First, the waiver must be written in
language that an average employee would understand.3" Second,
the waiver must include a specific reference to waiver of claims
arising under the ADEA.39 Third, the waiver cannot include
claims that arise after the date the waiver is signed/h Fourth,
36. See Paul, supra note 34, at 31. After analyzing the various restrictions
and requirements of Title II, Paul concluded that "the waiver provisions are
apparently an attempt by Congress to persuade employers not to use them."
Id. at 30. Another commentator described the effect of Title II of the OWBPA
as providing "significant new hoops for [e]mployers to jump through before
[ADEA] releases and waivers will be deemed valid." Peter M. Panken, Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS:
EMPLOYEE BENEFrTs LrriG. 551 (1991).
The OWBPA placed requirements on waivers to age discrimination claims
that are stricter than the common-law requirements regarding waiver of Title
VII claims:
Title II of the OWBPA reflects further legislative and executive
intent that the release or waiver of age discrimination claims under
the ADEA be subject to special standards and scrutiny beyond
those judicially developed for race and sex discrimination claims
under Title VII.
Harper, supra note 33, at 1272.
37. See infra note 46 for the necessary elements of waivers used in
conjunction with group termination plans.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). Although this criteria appears
to be straightforward, there are possible complications involved in interpreting
this section. Employers may have difficulty in determining what language an
average employee would understand. Paul, supra note 34, at 30. In addition,
the language of this provision implies that an individual employee who actually
understood the waiver may argue that they are not bound by the waiver
because an average person would not have understood it. Id. at 30-31.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(B).
40. Id. § 626(f)(1)(C). This is another section that suggests Congress
intended to discourage the use of waivers by employers. One commentator
suggested that employees can bring subsequent ADEA claims by signing the
waiver, accepting an early retirement package, leaving the company, and then
reapplying to the same company. Paul, supra note 34, at 32. The employer
would most likely not rehire the employee, and "the employee would be well
on his or her way to creating a prima facie case of age discrimination for
being denied a position of employment for which he or she is qualified." Id.
Another commentator noted that this section "is somewhat ambiguous, and
suggests that waivers signed under the OWBPA may be less comprehensive
and less effective than pre-OWBPA waivers." Douglas L. Williams, RIF's,
Early Retirement, and Releases After the OWBPA, 16 ALI-ABA CoURsE
MATEuALS J. 87 (Dec. 1991).
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the employer must provide consideration in addition to any
normal retirement benefit package. 41 Fifth, the employer must
advise the employee in writing to consult with an attorney before
signing the waiver. 42 Sixth, the employee must be given at least
twenty-one days to decide whether to sign the waiver.4 1 Seventh,
the employee must have the opportunity to revoke the agreement
within seven days of its execution.4
The OWBPA contains additional restrictions regarding the
validity of certain waiver agreements. For example, waivers can
be signed in order to settle EEOC charges or suits already filed
by the employee. 45 Waivers can be used in connection with
group or class early retirement or exit incentive programs, but
employers must comply with rigorous criteria in addition to the
first seven requirements." The OWBPA specifies that waivers
41. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(D).
42. Id. § 626(f)(1)(E).
43. Id. § 626(f)(1)(F). This 21-day period appears to be optional rather
than required. Williams, supra note 40, at 97. If the waiver is offered to a
group of employees, as in an exit incentive program, then the employer must
allow the employees to consider the offer for 45 days. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii).
One ambiguity in this section is the meaning of "group," which becomes
important because the time to consider the waiver for an offer to a group is
much longer than for an offer made to an individual. The OWBPA provides
no information as to how many employees make up a group, and thus courts
could interpret it to mean that an employer must give 45 days to consider
anytime the agreement is offered to more than 1 employee. Paul, supra note
34, at 31.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(G). Because of this requirement, the consideration
should not be paid to the employee until the seven-day period has passed.
Williams, supra note 40, at 97. In addition, the Act is silent on how the
revocation is to occur, so employers should work this out with the employee
at the time the waiver is signed. Id. at 97-98.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(2). In order for a waiver of this type to be effective,
the employer must comply with the first five criteria required for a normal
waiver, and must also give the employee a "reasonable period of time" to
consider the settlement. Id. § 626(f)(2)(B). Although Congress did not indicate
what constitutes a reasonable time period, 21 days is clearly acceptable, while
less than 21 days may be sufficient if the employee has an attorney. Panken,
supra note 36, at 2.
46. The section of the OWBPA regarding waivers used in group plans
provides:
(H) if a waiver is requested in connection with an exit incentive
or other employment termination program offered to a group or
class of employees, the employer, (at the commencement of the
period specified in subparagraph F) informs the individual in
writing in a manner calculated to be understood by the average
individual eligible to participate, as to,
(i) any class, unit, or group of individuals covered by such
program, any eligibility factors for such program, and any time
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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cannot be used to interfere in any way with an employee's right
to file a charge with the EEOC.47 Finally, the OWBPA specifies
that the burden of proof is on the employer when asserting the
validity of a waiver.4"
In addition to the restrictions placed on employers in the text
of the OWBPA, the legislative history reflects the intent of
Congress to limit employers' use of ADEA waivers. Congress
believed that the use of waivers without supervision or other
regulation could lead to manipulation and coercion of older
workers by their employers.49
II. THE TENDER/RATIFICATION ARGUMENT
Congress attempted to answer many of the questions involving
waivers of ADEA claims by passing the OWBPA.5 0 One issue
that was not addressed in the OWBPA involves waivers that are
invalid by either common-law or OWBPA standards. Employers
have argued that the invalid release is voidable rather than void,
and that the employee ratifies the voidable contract by retaining
the consideration received in exchange for the release l.5  This
argument is not new in contract law,5 2 but has just recently been
limits applicable to such program; and
(ii) the job titles and ages of all individuals eligible or selected
for the program, and the ages of all individuals in the same job
classification or organizational unit who are not eligible or selected
for the program.
29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(l)(H).
47. Id. § 626(f)(4). Although employees cannot waive their right to file a
charge with the EEOC or to participate in an EEOC investigation, a valid
waiver prohibits the employee from receiving financial gain from the EEOC
action. Williams, supra note 40, at 98.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(3).
49. The legislative history of the OWBPA states that a "major concern
* is that early retirees or employees being offered the chance to participate
in exit incentive or other group termination programs can effectively be forced
to waive their right to file a claim when the employer conditions such
participation on the signing of a waiver." S. REP. No. 79, 101st Cong, 1st
Sess. 9 (1989).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (Supp. IV 1992). See infra part I.B.
51. For a general discussion of the tender/ratification argument and an
analysis of the relevant case law, see John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson,
Revocation of Releases, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 1991, at 3; B. Scott Silverman,
Enforceability of Releases and Arbitration Agreements in Individual Employ-
ment Discrimination, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AND CIvnL RiGHrs ACTIONS N FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
(1992).
52. See, e.g., Anselmo v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 417 (8th
Cir. 1985) (finding that plaintiff waived state law claims for fraudulent
misrepresentation and breach of contract by refusing to tender benefits received
in exchange for signing the release). See also 76 C.J.S. Release § 37 ("[A]
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applied to claims under the ADEA.53 Prior to the OWBPA,
courts disagreed on how to approach the tender/ratification
argument, and the enactment of the OWBPA has not put an
end to the controversy.
A. Pre-OWBPA Decisions
Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits accepted the tender/
ratification argument in pre-OWBPA decisions. In Grillet v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co.,54 the plaintiff (Grillet) sued her employer
(Sears) after discovering that she may have been the victim of
age discrimination, although she had released potential ADEA
claims in exchange for a financial bonus.5 Grillet offered to
return the bonus if Sears would reinstate her and provide back
pay, which Sears refused.56 The district court found for Grillet57
On a motion for reconsideration, Sears asserted the tender/
ratification argument, and the issue reached the Fifth Circuit.5
The court relied on the basic contract principle of ratification
and agreed with Sears. 59 The court focused on the need to return
person who executes a release and afterward seeks to avoid its effect on any
ground which will entitle him to avoid it, must ordinarily first restore the
status quo by restoring, tendering, or offering to restore what he has received
in return for the release.").
53. Silverman, supra note 51, at 1109. Widener v. ARCO Oil & Gas Co.,
717 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. Tex. 1989) was apparently the first federal case to
consider the tender requirement with respect to ADEA waivers.
54. 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1991).
55. Sears informed Grillet, age 60 at the time, that the company was
eliminating her position due to reorganization. Sears gave Grillet the option
of $9000 severance pay with no release or $45,000 if she signed a release.
Grillet signed the release and took the $45,000 without consulting an attorney.
In signing the release and accepting the consideration, Grillet was aware of
her opportunity to meet with an attorney, and declined. Grillet thereafter
discovered that Sears had offered to relocate younger employees in her
department. Despite this knowledge, Grillet retained and continued to accept
her severance pay. Id. at 218.
56. Grillet made this offer approximately seven months after she filed suit.
This offer was made in conjunction with Grillet's opposition to Sears' motion
for summary judgment. Id.
57. The district court did not think that the waiver was knowing and
voluntary, and held that the refusal to tender did not ratify the waiver. Id.
58. Id. at 220.
59. The court directed entry of the employer's motion for summary judg-
ment. Grillet, 927 F.2d at 220-21. The court noted that "[a] party cannot be
permitted to retain the benefits received under a contract and at the same
time escape the obligations imposed by the contract." Id. at 220 (citing
Widener v. ARCO Oil & Gas Co., 717 F. Supp 1211 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (citing
Rachesky v. Finklea, 329 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. 1964))). In addition to Widener,
the court relied on several non-ADEA cases involving the alleged ratification
of a release. Grillet, 927 F.2d at 220 (citing Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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both parties to their pre-agreement status6° and rejected Grillet's
tender back offer as "too little, too late. ' 61 The court concluded
that Grillet should have returned the bonus immediately upon
learning of possible discrimination 62 and without additional de-
mands. 63
The Fourth Circuit adopted this same position in O'Shea v.
Commercial Credit Corp.4 Although the court determined that
the release was valid,65 the court addressed the tender/ratification
v. First Nationwide Bank, 873 F.2d 859, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1989) (concerning
the sale of a construction loan for a condominium project)); see also Morta
v. Korea Ins. Corp. v. First Nationwide Bank, 840 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1988)
(involving a release of claims against an automobile insurer); Anselmo v.
Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1985) (involving common-
law claims of breach of contract, prima facie tort, and fraudulent misrepre-
sentation resulting from a termination of employment); DiRose v. PK Man-
agement Corp., 691 F.2d 628 (2d Cir. 1982) (involving a claim by a lessor
against a lessee for fraud), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 915 (1983).
60. Grillet, 927 F.2d at 220. The court said that "[a] party seeking
rescission must attempt to restore the status quo ante - that is, to return the
parties to the positions they held before they entered into the agreement."
(citing United States v. Texarkana Trawlers, 846 F.2d 297, 304 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988)).
61. Grillet, 927 F.2d at 220.
62. Id. at 221. The court relied on Texarkana Trawlers, 846 F.2d at 305
n.20., which noted that the American common law of contracts requires a
party seeking rescission to do so "shortly after discovering the misrepresen-
tation." Id. (citing Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate
Consulting Co., 752 F.2d 178 (5th Cir. 1985)).
63. Grillet, 927 F.2d at 221. The court found that Grillet's offer of tender
conditioned on her restatement violated the principle of status quo ante because
she was not entitled to reinstatement prior to signing the waiver agreement.
Rather, Grillet would have to bring an age discrimination claim first in order
to be entitled to her old job. Id. (citing Thorstenson v. ARCO Alaska, Inc.,
780 P.2d 371, 375 (Alaska 1989) (holding that conditional tender offer does
not satisfy tender back requirement)).
64. 930 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1991). The plaintiff in O'Shea was terminated
and offered certain severance benefits in exchange for a release. Id. at 360.
The employer (Commercial Credit) offered O'Shea normal base salary for an
additional month, all unused vacation through the last day worked, 27 weeks
of severance pay, and a "determination" that plaintiff would be on an unpaid
leave of absence for the first 11 weeks of her absence. Id. at 359-60. The
final benefit would "bridge" plaintiff until her 55th birthday, and allow her
to receive early retirement benefits. Id. at 360. According to the court, these
additional benefits amounted to $23,000 worth of consideration in exchange
for waiving ADEA claims. Id. at 362 n.3. After consulting two attorneys,
O'Shea signed the agreement. Both attorneys with whom O'Shea consulted
examined the release and told her "that they weren't sure it was legal."
According to the court, O'Shea signed the release because she saw no alter-
natives and could not afford to live without the benefits offered as part of
the release. O'Shea thereafter discovered that her age may have been a factor
in her termination. Id. at 360.
65. Id. at 361-62. The court stated that there was no dispute among courts
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argument in the alternative and held that the plaintiff's retention
of the consideration reflected an intent to ratify the agreement. 66
The court's analysis discussed only basic contract law regarding
ratification.67 The court reprimanded O'Shea, the former em-
ployee, as attempting to "have it both ways." ' 6s In addition to
the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals, several district
courts have relied on contractual principles to allow ratifica-
tion. 69
Other courts, however, rejected the tender/ratification argu-
ment in pre-OWBPA decisions. In a lengthy opinion focusing
that waivers to ADEA claims would be valid if knowing and voluntary. Id.
at 361 (citing Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 (1974)
(holding that Title VII rights may be waived if the agreement was knowing
and voluntary)). The court found that the release was valid under ordinary
Maryland contract law because it was "voluntary, deliberate, and informed."
Id. at 362.
66. Id. at 362. The court noted that Commercial Credit would have
prevailed on the tender/ratification argument even if the release had been
invalid. Id.
67. Id. at 362. "It is a well-established proposition that the retention of
benefits of a voidable contract may constitute ratification." Id. (citing In re
Boston Shipyard, 886 F.2d 451, 455 (1st Cir. 1989); Anselmo v. Manufacturers
Life Ins. Co., 771 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1985)).
68. O'Shea, 930 F.2d at 363. O'Shea argued that she accepted the benefits
only because she thought that she was entitled to all of those benefits. Id. at
362-63. The court dismissed this argument, referring to a letter from O'Shea
to Senator Barbara Mikulski, in which O'Shea admitted that she had delayed
bringing an ADEA claim until after the receipt of her severance payment. Id.
at 363. The doctrine of ratification, the court said, was not designed to allow
people like O'Shea to "have it both ways." Id.
69. See Seward v. B.O.C. Div. of General Motors Corp., 805 F. Supp.
623, 633-34 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (noting that plaintiff "attempted to have his cake
and eat it too" by continuing to receive the consideration after he discovered
the alleged invalidity of the release); ffaslach v. Security Pacific Bank, Oregon,
779 F. Supp. 489, 493-94 (D. Or. 1991) (relying on Oregon contract law to
decide that a plaintiff who has signed a release must promptly return the
consideration before breaking the release) (citing Amort v. Tupper, 282 P.2d
660, 663 (Or. 1955)); Alphonse v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1075,
1079 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (granting employer's motion for summary judgment
based on North Carolina contract law that requires benefits of a release to
be tendered prior to avoiding the release) (citing Presnell v. Liner, 10 S.E.2d
639, 640 (N.C. 1940)); Ponzoni v. Kraft General Foods, 774 F. Supp. 299,
316-17 (D.N.J. 1991) (holding that plaintiff ratified the release by retaining
the $135,000 consideration); Constant v. Continental Tel. Co. of Ill., 745 F.
Supp. 1374, 1385 (C.D. I11. 1990) (noting that although the release in this
case was valid, a finding "that the Plaintiff ratified the agreement in this case
only provides an additional basis for dismissing Plaintiff's allegations of
duress"); Widener v. ARCO Oil & Gas Co., 717 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (N.D.
Tex. 1989) (holding that a party cannot seek to avoid their end of the bargain
and at the same time retain the benefits received from the other party) (citing
Rachelsky v. Finklea, 329 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. 1964)).https://op nscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/ 1
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on policy concerns, an Illinois district court in Isaacs v. Cater-
pillar, Inc. 70 declined to follow the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. 71
The court instead relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision
in Hogue v. Southern Railroad Company.7 2 Hogue held that a
release to a FELA claim signed based on mutual mistake could
not bar the employee's subsequent lawsuit on that claim. 7 3 The
Isaacs court relied on Hogue for the proposition that a tender
requirement is a federal question that requires examination of
the policy underlying the statute. 74
70. 765 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Ill. 1991). Other district courts have rejected
the tender/ratification argument. See Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co., No. 91-C3776, 1992 WL 368044 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 1992)
(distinguishing Grillet and O'Shea from the facts of this case because the
plaintiff here did not learn of the obligation to tender until after filing suit,
and because of the plaintiff's inadequate education and sophistication); Sperry
v. Post Publishing Co., 773 F. Supp. 1557, 1558 (D. Conn. 1991) (holding
that an employee did not ratify a voidable release by keeping the consideration
where the employee received all consideration before the ADEA claims were
recognized).
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit followed the Isaacs court approach in
Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 412 (1992). The Forbus court found Hogue applicable because it could
find no reason to restrict its application to FELA claims. Id. at 1041. The
court found Isaac's policy rationale persuasive, noting that a tender back rule
would encourage "egregious" behavior by employers. Id.
71. Isaacs involved a group of 70 former employees of Caterpillar who
each signed releases in exchange for extra benefits after electing an early
retirement plan. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1362. The benefits included: an
additional $400 per month for a certain period of time or that same sum in
lump sum form; full life insurance during the time the $400 monthly payments
were made; increased pension payments intended to reduce the penalty for
electing early retirement; and additional payments for plaintiffs who were part
of the Marketing Reorganization equal to three times their monthly base salary
minus tax. Id. at 1363-64. The plaintiffs filed suit under the ADEA and
claimed that the releases were not knowing and voluntary. Id. at 1364. The
plaintiffs never offered to return the consideration received in exchange for
signing the release. The employers sought summary judgment, relying on the
tender/ratification argument and the decisions in O'Shea and Grillet. Id.
72. 390 U.S. 516 (1968) (per curiam). In Hogue, the plaintiff suffered a
knee injury while working and signed a release agreement in exchange for
$105. Id. at 517. At the time of the release, both parties thought that the
knee injury was merely a bruise. Id. Subsequent examination revealed more
injuries and plaintiff had two operations, one that resulted in the loss of a
kneecap. Plaintiff tried to avoid the release on the theory that it had been
signed under "mistake of fact of both parties as to the extent of his injuries."
Id.
73. Id. FELA provides a tort compensation system that governs the liability
of railroads whose negligence causes injuries to their employees. 45 U.S.C. §§
51-60 (1988). See generally Jerry J. Phillips, An Evaluation of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 25 SAN DiEGo L. REV. 49 (1988).
74. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1366 (citing Hogue, 390 U.S. at 517 ("The
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The Isaacs court found four reasons why a tender requirement
is inconsistent with the ADEA's policy. 7" First, a tender require-
ment would deter meritorious claims. 76 According to the court,
Hogue's finding of a deterrent effect under FELA applies equally
to the ADEA. 77 The court recognized that it would be difficult
for retired persons to live without severance payments, and more
difficult for employees to return the money as time passed from
the point of receipt. 78 Second, the court evaluated congressional
intent. 79 According to the court, Congress had been preoccupied
with ADEA releases.80 After suspending the EEOC rule allowing
unsupervised releases, 81 Congress severely restricted the use of
releases in the OWBPA.s2 The chilling effect on lawsuits that a
tender requirement would create is not a result that Congress
would want. 83
Third, the court found that a tender requirement would render
the OWBPA useless.84 An employee could be precluded from
bringing a lawsuit under the ADEA despite a release that was
executed in gross violation of the OWBPA.85 Finally, the court
question whether a tender back of the consideration was a prerequisite to the
bringing of the suit is to be determined by federal rather than state law."
(citing Dice v. Akron, C.&.Y.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1951))).
75. Id. at 1366-67. The court noted generally that both FELA and the
ADEA are remedial statutes and both serve to protect employees. Id.
76. Id. at 1367.
77. Id.
78. Id. The court noted that Congress has taken statutory measures such
as ERISA to protect retired employees, recognizing that they "need all the
security they can get." Id.
79. The court noted that the "[c]ongressional history is relevant to the
tender issue, because Hogue instructs federal courts to consider whether a
tender requirement would interfere with the remedial purposes of the statute."
Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1367. Because the tender requirement would severely
restrict an employee's access to the remedies under the ADEA, congressional
history is relevant in this context. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. See infra note 126 for further discussion of the EEOC's regulation
and its subsequent suspension by Congress.
82. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1367. Caterpillar argued that the OWBPA did
not apply in this case because the releases were executed before the Act became
law. Id. at 1369. The court found that argument unpersuasive, finding that
the law of tender agreements was the same before and after the OWBPA. Id.
See supra notes 33-49 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the
OWBPA and its effect on the use of waivers to ADEA claims.
83. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1367.
84. Id.
85. Id. According to the court, "No matter how egregiously releases might
violate the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, em-
ployees would be precluded from challenging them unless they somehow could
come up with the money they were given when allegedly forced into retire-
ment." Id.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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discussed the problems in determining the consideration to be
tendered to achieve the status quo. 6 Employers generally do not
distinguish between consideration and ordinary retirement ben-
efits.87 Moreover, the court was concerned with unjustly enrich-
ing employers."' Part of the employer's economic benefit of the
waiver is early release of the employee.8 9 Therefore, a tender
requirement would allow the employer to avoid paying the
employee's salary and to retrieve the consideration provided for
this benefit.9
B. Post-OWBPA Cases
Although Grillet, O'Shea, and Isaacs provide insightful back-
ground into tender/ratification, the decisions are indeterminative
after the enactment of the OWBPA. The Fifth Circuit affirmed
its decision in Grillet to accept the employer's tender argument
in a case where the OWBPA was applicable to the relevant
releases. In Wamsley v. Champlin Refining & Chemicals, Inc.,91
86. Id. The courts in O'Shea and Grillet erroneously assumed that this
would be a "clearcut" decision, according to the court. Id.
87. Id. at 1368.
88. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1367.
89. The court viewed the exchange involved when an employee releases
ADEA claims quite differently than the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. The latter
assumed that the money or other consideration given by the employer is paid
in exchange for a promise not to file an ADEA claim. Furfaro & Josephson,
supra note 51, at 38 (discussing varying judicial viewpoints as to whether a
release is ratified and whether an employee must tender consideration after a
release).
The Isaacs court viewed the exchange as follows: the employer receives the
economic benefit of removing an older employee, while the employee receives
the economic benefit of the consideration. 765 F. Supp. at 1367. This approach
is not persuasive because the employer receives the economic benefit of
releasing an older employee from the minute that employee is terminated,
regardless of whether a release is signed. What the employer is really paying
for is the employee's promise not to bring a lawsuit. See Aalberts & Kelly,
supra note 6, at 739 ("An older worker is given severance benefits if he waives
forever any rights he may have to sue for damages under federal, state, or
local law." (emphasis added)).
90. Isaacs, 765 F. Supp. at 1367. The employee, however, would not have
her job. Id. In explaining why the status quo would not be restored, the court
stated that "[t]he employee is deprived of money paid to induce him to retire,
yet he or she is not restored to employment; all he or she gets is the rescission
of his or her release." Id.
91. 11 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 1993). Wamsley involved an office closing in
which the employer (Champlin) was forced to eliminate several jobs. Id. at
536. A group of employees released claims against Champlin in exchange for
added benefits. Id. at 536-37. The consideration included lump sum cash
payments; outplacement services; and medical, dental, and life insurance
benefits. Id. at 537 n.4. Several employees subsequently filed suit alleging age
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the court held that the OWBPA does not prohibit an employee
from ratifying an invalid release by retaining, i.e., failing to
tender back, the money received as consideration. 92
In Wamsley, the court addressed the "knowing and volun-
tary" standard under the OWBPA. 93 The court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that this language per se prohibits enforce-
ment of invalid waivers. 94 Again, the court relied on the doctrine
of contractual ratification, 95 and placed particular emphasis on
its conclusion that an invalid release was voidable rather than
void. 9 According to the court, the Act was designed to protect
employees from "fraud, duress, coercion, or mistake of material
facts,"' 97 evils that historically have rendered a contract voidable
rather than void under general contract law. 98
In addition, the court noted that the legislative history does
not mention that non-compliance with the OWBPA renders a
release void. 99 The court also reasoned that the Act's mandatory
seven-day revocation period'O° would not be necessary if non-
compliance rendered the waiver automatically void.'0 Finally,
the court noted that automatically void waivers would be incon-
sistent with the ADEA's goal of encouraging settlement'0 2 be-
cause employers would be less likely to offer settlements if
discrimination, yet retained the consideration for their waivers. Id. at 537.
When the case reached the Fifth Circuit, the court could not decide whether
the releases complied with the OWBPA. The court considered the knowing
and voluntary issue "immaterial in light of our conclusion that [the employees]
have ratified their releases as a matter of law." Id. at 538.
92. "[W]e hold that neither the language nor the purpose of the OWBPA
indicates a congressional desire to deprive an employee of the ability to ratify
a waiver that fails to meet the requirements of the OWBPA." Id. at 539-40.
For a description of the OWBPA requirements, see supra part II.B.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(1) (Supp. IV 1992).
94. Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 539.
95. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 85 (1981)).
96. Id. at 539.
97. S. REP. No. 101-263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1537.
98. Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 539 n.8 ("That the Committee enumerated several
of the traditional grounds of avoidance is significant.").
99. Id. "Also significant is the absence of any language in the statute and
any statement in the legislative history indicating that a waiver executed in
contravention of the OWBPA requirements is void of legal effect and cannot
be ratified by an employee." Id.
100. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(G) (Supp. IV 1992).
101. Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 539.
102. Id. The ADEA states as one of its purposes "to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988) (congressional statement of findings
and purpose).
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OWBPA problems would automatically void the agreements. 10 3
Thus, because defective releases are merely voidable, the Wain-
sley court concluded that employees can make new promises to
reaffirm their obligations under the release.' ° The court noted
that it "will enforce [the employees'] new conduct based prom-
ises as it legally and equitably should."' 0 5
The court next addressed whether Hogue v. Southern Railroad
Company' 6 is contrary to a tender back requirement. 107 The
Wamsley court identified three differences between FELA, the
statute at issue in Hogue, and the ADEA.10 First, the purpose
of FELA is to facilitate liberal recovery for employees, 1 9 a
purpose not recognized in the ADEA."0 Second, Wansley rec-
ognized a timing difference between settling FELA claims, which
are for physical injuries, and ADEA violations."' Under FELA,
the injury has already occurred," 2 as opposed to an ADEA case
in which the release is a compromise of potential or future
injuries." 3 Third, there is an "inference of liability" imputed
103. Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 539. The court noted that employers would be
unlikely to provide enhanced severance packages if faced with "continued
litigation with opponents who could use ... to finance their suit, the very
funds [the employer] paid as consideration to avoid litigation." Id. at 539
n.9.
104. The court defined "promise" for the purposes of this discussion as
"a manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way,
so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has
been made." Id. at 540 n.10 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
2 (1981)).
According to the court, employees who sue yet retain the consideration
make a new promise to be bound by the defective release. "Here the conduct
giving rise to Appellants' promise to perform under their wavers was their
retention of the consideration for their waivers." Id. The court noted that for
the purposes of evaluating the employees' conduct, an "objective theory of
contracts" applies rather than subjective intent. Id. (citing I SAMUEL WILuS-
TON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 98 (1957)). Because the court enforced the
new promise, it is irrelevant that the original release did not comply with the
OWBPA. Id. at 540 n.1 1. The new promise, according to the court, is not
subject to the requirements of the OWBPA. Id.
105. Id. at 540.
106. 390 U.S. 516 (1968) (per curiam). For a discussion of Hogue, see supra
notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
107. The Wamsley court concluded that other courts had "improperly
analogized the FELA to the ADEA and, thus, arrived at the erroneous
conclusion that Hogue precludes a 'tender back' requirement in suits brought
under the ADEA." 11 F.3d at 541 n.13.
108. Id. at 541-42.
109. Id. at 541.
110. Id. Although both statutes are remedial, they are "fundamentally
different in congressional purpose and intent." Id. at 541 n.13.
I 1l. Id. at 542.
112. Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 542.
113. Id.
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on the employer in FELA cases, whereas no such inference exists
in ADEA claims.'14 These distinctions in the purpose and pro-
cedures of FELA and the ADEA convinced the Wamsley court
that Hogue does not control ADEA waivers."
5
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Oberg v. Allied
Van Lines, Inc."6 found itself constrained by the plain language
of the OWBPA and rejected the employer's tender/ratification
argument."17 The Seventh Circuit analyzed the tender/ratification
argument as two distinct components: ratification and tender."'
114. Id. The court noted that ADEA claimants have the burden of proving
their employers' threshold liability. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(0(3).
115. The Waisley court stated that the Seventh Circuit in Oberg improperly
analogized FELA to the ADEA and thus arrived at "the erroneous conclusion
that Hogue precludes a 'tender back' requirement in suits brought under the
ADEA." Id. at 541 n.13.
116. 11 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1993). In another post-OWBPA Case, the district
court in Collins v. Outboard Marine Corp., 808 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. I11. 1992),
took an interesting approach in rejecting the ratification argument. In Collins,
the release was voidable, in part because it did not make specific reference to
waiver of ADEA claims as required by the OWBPA. Id. at 594. In rejecting
the employer's ratification argument because there was no legal obligation to
ratify, the court found that "the benefits plaintiff received could not have
been in exchange for the relinquishment of his rights under the ADEA, because
federal law now provides that those rights cannot be relinquished without a
specific reference to the ADEA in the written release." Id. at 595.
117. Oberg involved a reduction in force (RIF) involving approximately 60
employees of Allied Van Lines, Inc (Allied). 11 F.3d at 680. In conjunction
with the RIF, Allied offered the departing employees a choice between the
normal severance package and an enhanced package. The normal package
included 2 weeks salary and the enhanced package included approximately 20
weeks of pay in addition to the normal 2 weeks, as well as health benefits
and pension contributions for the duration of the severance payments. Id. at
681. In exchange for the enhanced package, the employees were required to
sign a release of all claims against the employer, including ADEA claims. Id.
In addition to the release, the severance agreement included a provision stating
that if the employees breached, they were required to return to Allied the
additional benefits received. Id. at 681 n.2.
The plaintiffs in Oberg accepted the enhanced package and signed the
release. Id. at 681. After receiving their last payments under the severance
packages, they filed a class action against Allied alleging violations of the
ADEA. The plaintiffs admitted that they never rejected nor returned any of
the enhanced severance benefits that they received from Allied. Upon reaching
the Seventh Circuit, the court quickly dismissed Allied's argument that the
waivers were valid. Id.
118. Id. at 682-85. The separation of ratification and tender into two
separate arguments is illogical. Other courts have properly treated employers'
tender/ratification arguments as one issue, assuming that the two concepts
analytically work together. See, e.g., Wamsley v. Champlin Refining & Chem.,
Inc., 11 F.3d 534, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1993); Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
958 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412 (1992); Grillet
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The court first rejected the ratification argument. According to
the court, a waiver that does not meet the conditions imposed
by the OWBPA is not "knowing and voluntary" and cannot
be a waiver under any conditions, including subsequent ratifi-
cation." 9 The court noted that it would have been inclined to
follow the Grillet and O'Shea opinions in the absence of this
plain language of the OWBPA. 2' Next, while the court approved
of a tender requirement under "notions of fairness,"' 2' it re-
jected the requirement because of Hogue."2 Following Isaacs
and Forbus, the court found that the policies of the ADEA and
FELA are analogous.'"
III. EVALUATION OF THE Two APPROACHES TO TENDER/
RATIFICATION
Both approaches to the tender/ratification issue are problem-
atic. In jurisdictions that have adopted a tender requirement,' 24
the employee must decide whether to risk the waiver consider-
ation in an attempt to receive more money from damages
awarded in a lawsuit. This approach ignores the intent of
Congress regarding waivers to ADEA claims, discourages com-
pliance with the OWBPA, and poses a difficult practical prob-
lem. Congress is concerned with the abuse of waivers.' 25 After
the EEOC passed a regulation upholding the use of unsupervised
waivers, Congress suspended this rule via appropriations bills
for almost three years.'26 In suspending this rule, Congress
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217, 221 (5th Cir. 1991).
But see N. Jansen Calamita, The Older Worker's Benefit Protection Act of
1990: The End of Ratification and Tender Back in ADEA Waiver Cases, 73
B.U. L. REV. 639, 663 (1993) ("When assessing the impact of the OWBPA,
it is useful to consider [tender and ratification] separately.").
119. Oberg, 11 F.3d at 683. The court noted, "Under OWBPA, unless a
waiver contract takes the form required by the statute, an employer and an
employee cannot contract to waive the ADEA provisions." Id. In support,
the court curiously relied on Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412 (1992), and Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc.,
765 F. Supp. 1359 (C.D. Ill. 1991), both of which involved pre-OWBPA
waivers.
120. Oberg, 11 F.3d at 683. "Had Congress not spoken this court may
have even been inclined to follow Grillet and O'Shea, and allow employees
the freedom to ratify their severance agreements through general principles of
contract law." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 683-84.
123. Id. at 684.
124. See supra part II for a discussion of the tender/ratification cases.
125. In Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc., the court referred to this as a "continuing
preoccupation with ADEA releases." 765 F. Supp. at 1359 (C.D. Il. 1991).
126. The EEOC rule, 52 Fed. Reg. 32,293, was suspended by the Senate
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expressed concern for the rights of older American workers" 7
and chastised the EEOC for abandoning the requirements of
the FLSA. 121 When Congress finally passed the OWBPA, the
stated purpose of the legislation was to prohibit the coercion
29
of older workers into waiving their rights. 30 As the court noted
in Isaacs v. Caterpillar,'3' a tender requirement would hinder
the ability of employees to bring ADEA suits, a result inconsis-
tent with Congress' desires. 32 Moreover, the tender/ratification
for one year in October 1987, 133 CONG. REc. 28,105-06 (1987), and that
decision was approved by the House of Representatives in December 1987,
133 CONG. REc. 37,241 (1987). Both the Senate and House extended the
suspension for an additional year in 1988 following hearings on the issue of
waivers to ADEA claims in the spring of 1988. 134 CoNG. REc. S7885 (daily
ed. July 26, 1988) (Senate); 134 CONG. REc. H1251 (daily ed. March 29,
1988). See generally S. REP. No. 101-79, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 6-9 (1989)
(outlining history of congressional response to EEOC rulemaking).
127. Congress "expressed grave concern that the [EEOC] rule was without
legal foundation and contrary to public policy." H.R. REP. No. 664, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1990). One group of Senators commented that "serious
questions have been raised about the degree to which the EEOC rule adversely
affects the important rights of older workers to be free from age-based
employment discrimination." Id. (quoting a letter from Senators Sasser, Leahy,
Grassley, Mikulski, DeConcini, Weicker, Reid, Chiles, and Lautenberg).
128. Senators Metzenbaum and Melcher "criticized the EEOC for aban-
doning the 'supervised waiver' requirements of the FLSA." S. REP. No. 79,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1989).
129. Congress relied on statistics showing how easily older employees can
be coerced into accepting a waiver by their employers. For example, age
discrimination victims earn an average of $15,000 per year. In addition, older
Americans that are out of work have less than a 50% chance of finding new
employment. Finally, older workers often do not have the luxury of savings,
and may not yet be eligible for Social Security. Id. at 9.
130. According to the legislative history of the OWBPA, "The bill also
amends the ADEA to ensure that older workers are not coerced or manipulated
into waiving their rights to seek legal relief under the [ADEA]." H.R. REP.
No. 664, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1990). In addition, Congress said that the
OWBPA "is designed to protect older workers' rights and not to take them
away." Id. at 54. The OWBPA places many restrictions on the use of waivers.
See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the restrictions
on waivers included in the OWBPA.
131. 765 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
132. The district court noted that
retired employees need all the security they can get; Congress has
passed ERISA and other laws based on this assumption. Such
workers are unlikely to be able to put their severance payments
aside for future 'tenders', or to be able to come up with the
money to make such a tender at such later time as they acquire
grounds to believe that a successful lawsuit might be mounted in
connection with their retirements.
Id. at 1367.
Moreover, the legislative history of the ADEA exhibits a general purpose
of protecting older American workers. H.R. REp. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1sthttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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argument discourages employers from complying with the
OWBPA.'33 Employers are apt to gamble with invalid releases
if employees must return the money as a precedent to filing
suit. 3 4 In light of congressional interest in employees' rights, it
is unlikely that Congress would allow employers to circumvent
the OWBPA and not suffer economically for doing so.
The tender requirement also presents a practical problem
regarding the amount of money employees would have to
tender. 5 The OWBPA does not require employers to distinguish
between normal benefits and those offered in exchange for
waivers. 3 6 This problem occurred in O'Shea v. Commercial
Credit Corp.,3 7 in which the employee received $23,371.20 in
severance pay and claimed that it was an entitlement rather than
consideration for the waiver."' The court settled on an approx-
imate figure representing consideration for the waiver. 39 Allow-
Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2214. The stated purpose
of the ADEA is: "[T]o promote employment of older persons based on their
ability rather than age, to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment,
and to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising
from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988). See also
Samborn, supra note 1, at 30. Samborn quoted Paul H. Tobias, a plaintiffs'
employment lawyer, who noted that tender/ratification cases are "very im-
portant because people that are fired are desperate and need the money to
live on." George F. Galland Jr., another employees' attorney, commented
that "if there's one thing [Congress] didn't have in mind . . . it's giving the
money back. It's insane. It's literally insane." Id.
133. The court in Isaacs adopted this reasoning. "No matter how egregiously
releases might violate the requirements of the Older Workers Benefit Protection
Act, employees would be precluded from challenging them unless they some-
how could come up with the money they were given when allegedly forced
into retirement." 765 F. Supp. at 1367.
134. The district court in Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, Inc. relied on this
reasoning in rejecting a tender requirement. No. 91-C6576, 1992 WL 186098
(N.D. Ill. 1992). The court stated:
[W]e believe that a tender requirement would encourage employers
to ignore the specific provisions of the Act in hopes that by the
time their former employees discover that the releases that they
signed are voidable, they will be in no economic position to tender
back or refuse to accept the special severance benefits accorded
them.
Id. at *6.
135. The court in lsaacs noted that an employer generally does not indicate
how much of the consideration is normal retirement benefits and how much
is in exchange for the waiver. 765 F. Supp. at 1368.
136. The OWBPA requires only "consideration in addition to anything of
value to which the individual already is entitled." 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(D)
(Supp. IV 1992).
137. 930 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1991).
138. Id. at 362 n.3.
139. "In sum, O'Shea received approximately $23,000 (not including notice
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ing the court to estimate the amount of tender presents the
possibility that employees will be forced to tender money that
was actually an entitlement.
Rejection of the tender requirement is also susceptible tor
policy-based criticism. This approach fails when the employee
loses their ADEA case but gets to retain the waiver considera-
tion.140 The employer gets nothing in return for the consideration
it paid, 41 and is burdened by the lawsuit that it paid to avoid .1
4
Contract law accepts that a party to a voidable contract may
ratify it by retaining the consideration. 143 This analysis presumes
that a contract executed under illegal circumstances is voidable,
rather than automatically void. 44 When the complaining party
pay and unused, accrued vacation pay) and a 'bridging' arrangement, which
saved her some pension losses, in consideration for her agreement to waive
any ADEA claims that she might have had." Id.
140. If the employee wins and receives a monetary judgment, that judgment
would be offset by the amount received for the waiver. See Hogue v. Southern
Railway Co., 390 U.S. 516, 518 (1967) ("The sum paid shall be deducted
from any award determined to be due to the injured employee."); see also
Oberg, 11 F.3d at 685 ("Defendants may only obtain a set-off of the severance
benefits paid from any award determined to be due Plaintiffs.").
141. The easy response is that it is the employer's fault if the waiver was
invalid. See, e.g., Calamita, supra note 118, at 670. However, the OWBPA
did not take the subjectivity out of determining whether a release if valid. See
infra notes 38-41 for a discussion of some of the ambiguities in the require-
ments of the OWBPA. Brian W. Bulger, an attorney representing employers,
stated that there will be much litigation concerning the OWBPA requirements
"[u]ntil the parameters on OWBPA are explained in much clearer fashion."
Samborn, supra note 1, at 30.
142. This is where the discussion of the Isaacs approach, 765 F. Supp. at
1366-76, to waivers becomes important. See supra note 89. If the court's
approach is correct in viewing the exchange as providing the employer the
economic benefit of releasing an older employee, then the employer is not
stripped of its consideration when a lawsuit is brought by the employee. If
this were correct, rejection of the tender requirement would be more logical.
However, as discussed supra note 89, this concept of the exchange is illogical.
143. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 380 cmt. a (1981)
("A party who has the power of avoidance may lose it by action that manifests
a willingness to go on with the contract. Such action is known as 'affirmance'
and has the effect of ratifying the contract."); 76 C.J.S. Release § 37 (1952)
(stating that a party seeking to avoid a release "must ordinarily first restore
the status quo by restoring, tendering, or offering to restore what he has
received in return for the release"); M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Ratification
of Contract Voidable for Duress, 77 A.L.R. 2d 426, 439 (1961) ("Acceptance
and retention of benefits growing out of a contract executed under duress,
after the influence of the duress has been removed, were held ... as showing
a ratification of the contract ...").
144. See, e.g., In re Boston Shipyard Corp., 886 F.2d 451, 455 (1st Cir.
1989) (holding that a construction contract was voidable when induced by
duress) (citing DiRose v. PK Management Corp., 691 F.2d 628, 633-34 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 915 (1983)).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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realizes that the contract was not legally executed, the party is
obligated to promptly contest the contract.145 If the party fails,
they may ratify the contract in a variety of ways,'4 including
retention of the consideration.147 Abandoning this contract prin-
ciple may unfairly punish employers, especially "innocent" em-
ployers that unintentionally violate the OWBPA.'4 Such concerns
may also make employers less willing to rely on waivers, 149 or
lead employers to decrease consideration for such agreements. 50
Both possibilities would financially harm older workers.
In an attempt to determine whether to impose a tender re-
quirement, litigators, courts, and commentators have invoked a
litany of allegedly persuasive materials, including the language
of the OWBPA, the purpose of the OWBPA and of the ADEA,
the common law of contracts, and Supreme Court precedent.
Application of these legal tools has resulted in a draw. The
approach taken by the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, which
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., United States v. McBride, 571 F. Supp. 596, 613 (S.D. Tex.
1983). McBride recognized that a party may ratify a voidable contract by
intentionally accepting benefits under the contract, by acknowledging its
validity, and by remaining silent for a period of time after realizing the
opportunity to avoid it. Id.
147. Id. at 613. See also Reed v. SmithKline Beckman Corp., 569 F. Supp.
672, 676 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (employee's acceptance of salary and other benefits
constitutes ratification of a release to all claims arising from termination of
the employee following her arrest).
148. See supra notes 34-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
OWBPA and some of its ambiguous provisions.
149. Discouraging use of releases does not promote Congress' interest in
voluntary settlement. The legislative history of the ADEA supports private
settlement of potential claims. 123 CONG. Ruc. 34,296 (1977) (quoting Senator
Williams, "IT]he ADEA should allow the employee to resolve the dispute
himself or work out a compromise with an employer."). fn particular, Congress
recognized the delays that are inherent in the dockets of most federal agencies,
and suggested that older Americans have a special interest in avoiding these
delays. Age Discrimination in Employment Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25(1967) (statement of Senator Javits).
150. Prior to the passage of the OWBPA, several large corporations wrote
letters to Congress expressing their concern with the limitations on releases
being proposed. The corporations indicated that the limitations would decrease
the amount of incentives offered to older employees. For example, General
Mills wrote that "the legislation will have a prejudicial effect on the class of
individuals sought to be protected by severely restricting the opportunities for
companies to make these gratuitous payments." H.R. REP. No. 664, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1990) (letter from General Mills Corporation). If the
proposed limitations were going to decrease the incentives offered by employ-
ers, it is likely that a rejection of the tender requirement would have the same
effect.
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rejected a tender requirement, is most consistent with Congress'
purpose in passing the ADEA and the OWBPA.' 5' While Con-
gress' intent with respect to a tender requirement in enacting
the OWBPA is not clear,'5 2 it is illogical to rely on common-
law contract principles that conflict with the policies of the Act,
especially when the Act imposes requirements for waivers that
are stricter than those under the common law. Moreover, em-
ployers should bear the financial risk associated with waivers.
Employers are more able to pay the costs, and also can take
effective steps to avoid the tender/ratification issue through
compliance with the OWBPA.' 53
IV. AVOIDING THE RATIFICATION ISSUE
A. Adherence to the OWBPA
Until the Supreme Court resolves the tender/ratification is-
sue,'54 employees and employers should continue to attempt to
effectively settle potential age discrimination claims.' 5 Obvi-
ously, it is important for employers to comply with the OWBPA.
Although employers with invalid releases may assert the tender/
ratification argument, that argument is now at the mercy of an
unsettled judiciary. In addition, courts may be, and arguably
should be, less sympathetic to counterclaims'5 6 and defenses
asserted by employers who failed to follow the OWBPA.57
151. Calamita, supra note 118, at 664-65. Calamita noted: "The clear
implication of the OWBPA's language and history is that any continued use
of the ratification doctrine to rescue invalid waivers of ADEA claims would
do violence to the Act's provisions and its aims." Id.
152. Neither the OWBPA nor its legislative history expressly discuss a tender
requirement.
153. See infra part IV.A. for the suggestion that employers adhere to the
OWBPA to avoid the ratification issue.
154. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in two of the cases involving
the tender/ratification argument. See Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958
F.2d 1036 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412 (1992); O'Shea v. Com-
mercial Credit Corp., 930 F.2d 358 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 177
(1991).
155. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988). See also S. REP. No. 101-263, 101st Cong.,
2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1566 (noting "bipartisan
Congressional support for the informal resolution of ADEA claims ... ).
156. See infra part V for a discussion of counterclaims by employers for
breach of covenant not to sue or unjust enrichment.
157. The district court in Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, Inc. exhibited little
sympathy in response to the employer's argument that "it is unfair to permit
the Plaintiffs to retain the special consideration that they received for executing
the releases and then 'double dip' by filing an ADEA lawsuit." 1992 WL'
211506, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff'd, 11 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1993). The courthttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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Nevertheless, by adhering to the OWBPA, employers provide
information that may reveal age discrimination." 8 Employers
that violate the OWBPA in order to conceal harmful information
must realize the risk they take and be prepared to defend against
ADEA claims.
Post-OWBPA cases reveal that employers both ignore straight-
forward OWBPA requirements 15 9 and are confused about
OWBPA requirements.160 As an example of the latter, in Oberg
v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 61 the employer, noting that Congress
did not define the word "group" in the OWBPA, argued that
its termination program did not involve a group of employees.162
noted that "Allied had an opportunity to present its employees with a written
waiver that met all of the OWBPA requirements." Id.
Similarly, in Collins v. Outboard Marine Corp., the district court was
skeptical of the employer's argument that the plaintiff was estopped from
pursuing his ADEA claim despite a release that was invalid under the OWBPA.
808 F. Supp. 590 (N.D. I11. 1992). In response to the estoppel argument, the
court stated "unfortunately for defendant, the agreement as executed does
not include a release from an ADEA claim." Id. at 595. See generally Lisa
M. Imborgno, Can You Have Your Cake and Eat it Too? Ratification of
Releases to ADEA Claims, 20 FoRi. URB. L.J. 311, 339 (1993) (suggesting
that employers may file counterclaims against employees for the consideration,
but commenting that "[tihere is a risk that the employee may be a judgment-
proof plaintiff; however, the employer has assumed this risk by using a faulty
release and by not complying with the law.").
158. The legislative history of the OWBPA states:
The principal difficulty encountered by older workers in these
circumstances is their inability to determine whether the program
gives rise to a valid claim under the ADEA. In many circumstances,
an older worker will have no information at all regarding the
scope of the program or its eligibility criteria. The informational
requirements set forth in the bill are designed to give all eligible
employees a better picture of these factors.
S. REp. No. 101-263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1509, 1539. See also Williams, supra note 25, at 99-100.
159. In Carr v. Armstrong Air Conditioning, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 54, 57
(N.D. Ohio 1993), the court found that the release was invalid because it
failed to specifically refer to claims under the ADEA (29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(B)
(Supp. IV 1992)); the employee was never notified in writing to consult an
attorney (§ 626(f)(1)(E)); the employee received 5 days rather than 21 days to
consider the release (§ 626(f)(1)(F)(i)); and the employee did not have 7 days
to revoke the release (§ 626(f)(1)(G)). Similarly, in Collins v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 808 F. Supp. 590, 594 (N.D. Ill. 1992), the release was invalid because
it did not specifically mention rights under the ADEA (§ 626(f)(1)(B)); the
plaintiff did not get 21 days to consider the release (§ 626(f)(I)(F)(i)); and the
plaintiff was not advised in writing to seek an attorney's advice (§ 626(f)(1)(E)).
160. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
OWBPA requirements regarding waivers and some of the possible ambiguities
of the provisions.
161. 11 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 116-23 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Oberg.
162. Id. at 682.
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The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating that "sixty plus employees
terminated at one time satisfies OWBPA's definition of group
termination ... ,,163 In Wamsley v. Champlin Refining & Chem-.
icals, Inc.,164 the release covering a group termination properly
mandated in writing a forty-five day waiting period. 16 However,
employees challenged the release, claiming that certain employer
personnel "orally countermanded" the written forty-five day
period.16 The Fifth Circuit considered the issue immaterial be-
cause it concluded the plaintiffs had ratified the release via
tender/ratification. 167
Because of the ambiguities in the OWBPA, employers can
never be certain that a release will provide a valid defense to
an ADEA lawsuit. Employers, however, should assess their
goals, and if desired, maximize the possibility of a valid defense
by adhering to the requirements of the OWBPA. This step in
itself would decrease litigation and avoid some uncertainty caused
by the ratification argument.
B. Placement of the Consideration in Escrow
To avoid the tender/ratification problem, Congress should
consider amending the OWBPA to allow employers to put the
consideration in escrow' until the statute of limitations for
filing an ADEA suit has passed. After the limitations period
has expired, 69 the employee would receive the consideration with
163. Id.
164. 11 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 1993). See supra notes 91-115 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Wamsley.
165. Id. at 538. The OWBPA requires a 45-day waiting period before
employees have to sign group releases. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(F)(ii) (Supp. IV
1992).
166. Wamsley, 11 F.3d at 538.
167. Id.
168. Black's Law Dictionary defines an escrow account as "[a] bank account
generally held in the name of the depositor and an escrow agent which is
returnable to depositor or paid to third person on the fulfillment of an escrow
condition.. ." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 545 (6th ed. 1990). The "escrow
condition" in this situation would be the expiration of the statute of limitations
period. For consideration paid in installments rather than in a lump sum, the
employer would withhold the extra benefits until the limitations period had
expired, and then pay a lump sum to the employee to compensate for all
missed payments.
169. Admittedly, this option faces problems because the limitations period
under the ADEA depends on the EEOC's investigation. Prior to filing a
lawsuit under the ADEA, employees have either 180 or 300 days to file a
charge with the EEOC. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1988). This deadline varies by
state. According to EEOC regulations, if a state has its own age discrimination
law and authority administering the law, the deadline is 300 days. If not, the
deadline is 180 days. 29 C.F.R. § 1626.7(b) (1993). Moreover, the EEOC ishttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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interest. Under this system, employers could not require em-
ployees to waive their right to file a charge with the EEOC or
to participate in an EEOC investigation during this time. 170
Employers would have to inform employees (1) that these rights
exist and (2) that exercise of the rights would not jeopardize
the status of the money in escrow. However, if the employee
filed a lawsuit in addition to an EEOC charge while the money
was in escrow, the employer would retain the money with
interest. Therefore, an employer would never be forced to defend
ADEA litigation funded by the waiver consideration.17'
The escrow option would arguably harm employees because
it would force them to wait a potentially long period of time
before gaining access to the money. 72 However, with the un-
certainty regarding the tender/ratification argument, attorneys
for employees should be encouraging employees to place sever-
ance money in a separate account until they decide not to pursue
an ADEA lawsuit, thus creating a de facto escrow account. 73
Furthermore, employees would not face undue hardship because
they receive normal retirement benefits aside from the waiver
consideration. 74 In addition, employees who refrain from suing
required to notify the charging party upon completion of the investigation or
other termination of the charge. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (Supp. IV 1992) (as
amended by Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991)). Pursuant
to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the charging party then has 90 days from the
date notice is received from the EEOC to file an ADEA lawsuit. Id.; see,
e.g., Rich v. Zeneca, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 162, 166-67 (D. Del. 1994) (applying
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amendments regarding the time limits under the
ADEA). The variable that renders the ADEA limitations period uncertain is
the length of time it takes the EEOC between the time the charge is filed and
the time the charging party is notified.
170. The OWBPA states: "No waiver agreement may affect the Commis-
sion's rights and responsibilities to enforce this Act. No waiver may be used
to justify interfering with the protected right of an employee to file a charge
or participate in an investigation or proceeding conducted by the Commission."
29 U.S.C. § 626(0(4) (Supp. IV 1992).
171. S. REp. No. 101-263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1564 ("[I]t is not unreasonable for employers ... to
seek some assurance that an employee will not accept a generous benefit and
then sue the employer the next day.").
172. Although discussed in the context of tender rather than withholding
benefits, the court in Isaacs Y. Caterpillar, Inc. noted the financial constraints
placed on many older workers, particularly in the situation of early retirement
programs: "In general, retired employees need all the security they can get;
Congress has passed ERISA and other laws based on this assumption." 765
F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (C.D. Il. 1991).
173. The OWBPA requires employers to advise employees to consult with
an attorney before signing the release. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(E) (Supp. IV
1992).
174. Statistics show that over one-half of the income of individuals over
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would eventually receive additional money from the accrued
interest after the statute of limitations had expired. Finally, it
is less devastating to departing employees to delay payment than
it is to require them to return money already received.' 75 In the
former situation, the employees have notice and can budget
accordingly.
V. BEYOND TENDER/RATIICATION
Waiver litigation currently exists beyond the issue of tender/
ratification. Employers often include covenants not to sue in
severance agreements, and employers can sue employees who
bring ADEA suits for breach of contract or unjust enrichment. 7 6
Employers that are serious about avoiding litigation of age
discrimination issues should include a covenant not to sue in
addition to the standard release. 77 A covenant not to sue (cov-
enant) is different than a release in both theory and practice.'
A covenant prohibits an employee who has a right or claim
the age of 65 is attributed to Social Security and assets. U.S. SEN. SPECIAL
CoMM. ON AGING ET AL., AGING AMERICA: TRENDS AND PROIECTONs 62-64
(1991). The same statistics indicate that earnings are declining as a source of
income, while Social Security is on the rise. Id. at 64. In 1988, the income
sources of individuals 65 and over was as follows: 38% Social Security, 25%
assets, 18% pensions, 17% earnings, and 3% other. Id. at 63 (pie graph).
175. The cases noting a "crippling effect" on employees did so in reference
to the tender requirement, which would involve taking money already paid to
the employees. See, e.g., Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036,
1041 (l1th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412; Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765
F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
176. Although these actions could be brought as original causes of action,
Curtis v. Belden Elect. Co., 760 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Ky. App. 1988), many
employers file counterclaims in response to employee's ADEA lawsuits. Pro-
cedures for counterclaims in federal court are governed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. FED. R. Crv. P. 13. Some employers may not like the
idea of taking or threatening to take affirmative steps to recover from past
employees simply because it is not good for public relations or employee
morale. In this case, employers should ensure that their release meets the
OWBPA requirements.
177. See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
grounds on which employees can defend against actions brought by employers
based on a covenant not to sue.
178. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 711 (C.D. I1. 1988)
(addressing motion to dismiss). In this first Isaacs opinion, the court distin-
guished covenants not to sue from releases as follows:
[The agreement at issue in this case] does not contain any provision
specifically promising not to file a lawsuit, or providing for
damages if a lawsuit is filed that is found to be barred by the
release, or providing for attorney's fees and costs. A release of
this type, which merely states that claims are discharged and
released, will hereinafter by referred to as a "defensive release."
Id. at 713.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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from enforcing that right or claim.' 79 Because the covenant does
not make the right go away, a person holding the right always
maintains a cause of action. 80 If the person seeks to enforce
the right, however, they may have to respond to a breach of
contract claim.' 8' In contrast, a release is the relinquishment or
abandonment of a right. 82 A valid release prohibits the person
originally holding the right from enforcing the right because it
no longer exists.' 3
Courts do not void on public policy grounds the use of
covenants not to sue with respect to employment claims.'8 4
Covenants are treated like contracts, and thus are generally
governed by state law. 8 5 Accordingly, in most jurisdictions, the
covenants must comply with the common-law knowing and
voluntary standard.'86 Because the OWBPA deals only with
defensive releases and does not refer to covenants not to sue,'8 7
these covenants arguably do not have to comply with the re-
quirements of the OWBPA. However, employers should use
OWBPA as a standard for how to execute a knowing and
voluntary contract.' 8
Astor v. International Business Machines Corp.'8 9 illustrates
the use of covenants in conjunction with the release of employ-
179. "[A] covenant not to sue is an agreement by one having a present
right of action against another not to sue to enforce such right." Colton v.
New York Hospital, 385 N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976). See also 66
AM. JUR. 2D Release § 2 (1973); 76 C.J.S. Release § 3 (1952).
180. Colton, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 66 ("Thus, the party possessing the right of
action is not precluded thereby from thereafter bringing suit.").
181. Id.
182. Id. See also 66 Am. JtnR. 2D Release § 1 (1973); 76 C.J.S. Release §
1 (1952).
183. Colton, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 66.
184. See, e.g., Rogers v. General Electric Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454 (5th Cir.
1986) (citing Monyei v. Dresser Indus., 701 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1983)).
185. Such covenants are governed by state law "except to the extent that
such law may be inconsistent with the ADEA." Isaacs, 702 F. Supp. at 713
(citing Air Line Stewards v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 713 F.2d 319, 321
(7th Cir. 1983)). See also Philip M. Halpern, Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment: Releases Protect Employers Too!, 8 LAB. LAWYER 949, 956 (1992) ("The
covenant not to sue is a simple contract and should be construed as nothing
more.").
186. See supra notes 18-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
common-law knowing and voluntary standard for releases to employment
claims.
187. 29 U.S.C. § 626(0 (Supp. IV 1992).
188. See, e.g., Paul, supra note 34, at 33 (advising employers with respect
to the use of covenants not to reapply, and noting that employers "should
probably attempt to follow the 'knowing and voluntary' guidelines established
by the OWBPA").
189. 7 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 1993).
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ment claims. In Astor, a group of employees voluntarily resigned
from IBM as part of a RIF.'g° Each of the employees signed a
"General Release and Covenant Not to Sue" in exchange for
which they received consideration from IBM.' 9' The employees
brought an ERISA action'9 alleging that IBM made misrepre-
sentations and threats that caused the employees to accept the
early retirement program earlier than required,' 93 thereby causing
loss of salary, benefits, and other compensation. 194 IBM coun-
terclaimed, relying in part on the covenant not to sue' 95 and
seeking attorneys' fees and costs.'9 The Sixth Circuit found that
the employees had breached the covenants not to sue and
awarded attorneys' fees to IBM pursuant to the covenants. 9
Employers that use severance agreements should include a
clause making the covenant severable from the release so that
the covenant remains valid even if the release is invalid for
failure to comply with the OWBPA. 98 The employer should
provide consideration for both the release and the covenant. 199
190. Id. at 534.
191. Id. at 535-36.
192. IBM conceded that the benefit program at issue in Astor was subject
to ERISA. Id. at 536.
193. Id.
194. Astor, 7 F.3d at 536.
195. IBM also relied on ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1988), in advancing
its counterclaim. Id. at 540. The ERISA claims involved in Astor are beyond
the scope of this Note.
196. Id.
197. Id. The Sixth Circuit cited the following passage from Artvale, Inc.
v. Rugby Fabric Corp., 363 F.2d 1002, 1008 (2d Cir. 1966):
Certainly it is not beyond the powers of a lawyer to draw a
covenant not to sue in such terms as to make clear that any breach
will entail liability for damages, including the most certain of all
- defendant's litigation expense.
See generally Halpern, supra note 185, at 951-53 (discussing the Artvale
decision as the "genesis" of subsequent holdings regarding covenants not to
sue).
198. A sample severability clause is as follows:
It is understood and agreed by the parties that if any part, term,
or provision of this contract is held by the courts to be illegal or
in conflict with any law of the state where made, the validity of
the remaining portions or provisions shall not be affected, and
the rights and obligations of the parties shall be construed and
enforced as if the contract did not contain the particular part,
term, or provision held to be invalid.
AM. JuR. FoRms 2D, Severability § 68:166 (1988).
199. See Paul, supra note 34, at 33 (noting in the context of covenants not
to reapply that "consideration should be offered separate from any exit
incentive or consideration for a waiver signed by the employee"). Cf. Riley
v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 368 (7th Cir. 1989). In Riley,
the plaintiff filed administrative charges and state claims against her employerhttps://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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Although courts generally do not examine the adequacy of
consideration, M a valid contract requires some consideration.
20
'
Accordingly, employers should expressly apportion the consid-
eration between the release and covenant because this will alert
both the employees and the courts that there was independent
consideration provided in exchange for the covenant.
20 2
Separating consideration, however, creates concerns, especially
with group plans. Employers may value ADEA waivers, cove-
nants not to sue, and other items differently depending on the
individual employee's job position, age, or other characteristics.
However, it is possible that an employer may violate the ADEA, 203
alleging sex and other discrimination. Id. at 369. Because she feared potential
court costs if the claims were dismissed by the court, the plaintiff's counsel
dismissed the state and some administrative claims, and released the plaintiff's
right to all other claims except her right to pursue one of the administrative
claims. Id. When the plaintiff subsequently attempted to bring a Title VII
action in federal court, the defendant invoked the release as grounds for
dismissing the suit. Id. at 370. In support of her argument to maintain the
Title VII suit, the plaintiff argued that the release was invalid due to lack of
consideration because the consideration was given only in exchange for her
dismissal of state claims. Id. at 375. The court noted the following in rejecting
the plaintiff's argument:
The release, however, does not assign individual consideration to
each claim waived by the plaintiff. Given that the release as a
whole was supported by some consideration, plaintiff cannot attack
the validity of her release based on the retrospective inadequacy
of the settlement.
Id. (citing Glass v. Rock Island Refining Corp., 788 F.2d 450 (7th Cir. 1986)).
200. See generally Black Indus. v. Bush, 110 F. Supp. 801, 805 (D.N.J.
1953); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 cmt. c ("Ordinarily, there-
fore, courts do not inquire into the adequacy of consideration."). But see
Dibiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 834 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
The district court in Dibiase, addressing a motion to dismiss, held that the
employer could violate the ADEA by offering more consideration to employees
under 40 years old than those over 40 in exchange for their surrender of all
claims against the employer. Id. at 145-47. Although all employees received
the same consideration, the plaintiffs successfully argued that employees over
40 may have received less for their money because their releases included
ADEA claims. Id. at 146. The court in Dibiase arguably acted improperly in
examining the adequacy of the consideration involved in the transaction.
201. Riley, 881 F.2d at 375 (noting the "proposition that releases of federal
rights must be supported by consideration").
202. There may presumably be other items that the employee is "selling"
to the employer in the same separation agreement, including covenants not to
compete, not to disclose trade secrets and other confidential information, and
not to reapply, see Paul, supra note 34, at 33-34. In addition, there are the
normal retirement benefits to which employees are often entitled. It is not
clear whether the employer must apportion specific amounts to these items or
only with respect to the release and covenant. Arguably, the agreement can
only be knowing and voluntary if the employee knows exactly how much
money she is receiving in exchange for the various rights she is foregoing.
203. See, e.g., Dibiase, 834 F. Supp. at 145, discussed supra note 200, for
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ERISA,20 4 or Title I of the OWBPA20 5 by expressly providing
greater benefits to younger employees. Therefore, apportioning
may subject employers to additional liability. In addition, em-
ployers may disfavor apportionment of damages for each sep-
arate release or covenant because such treatment of damages
essentially amounts to liquidated damages, which limit the em-
ployers recovery.206
To recover attorneys' fees for breach of a covenant not to
sue, employers should expressly provide for those damages in
the written agreement. 207 Payment of attorneys' fees in federal
court is governed by the American rule, which requires each
party to pay their own attorneys' fees. 28 Prevailing parties in
federal court do not recover attoneys' fees from the other party
absent contractual or statutory authorization.
Even when attorneys' fees are not contractually provided for,
some courts allow the employer to recover attorneys' fees when
an example of an argument that different amounts of consideration offered
to different employees may violate the ADEA.
204. The ERISA implications of the apportionment of consideration in
separation agreements are beyond the scope of this Note.
205. Title I of the OWBPA requires employers making aged-based reduc-
tions to provide equal benefits to older and younger employees unless it is
significantly more costly to provide the benefit to older employees. Pub. L.
No. 101-433, §§ 103, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623 (Supp.
IV 1992)). An argument similar to the one in Dibiase could presumably be
made under Title I of the OWBPA. See supra note 200 for a discussion of
Dibiase.
206. Although liquidated damages are no longer generally disfavored, courts
will examine such damages with some degree of scrutiny to ensure fairness.
See, e.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (stating
in government contract case that liquidated damages are no longer disfavored
and will be enforced when they represent "fair and reasonable attempts to fix
just compensation.. ."); Overholt Crop Ins. Serv. Co. v. Travis, 941 F.2d
1361 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying South Dakota law and noting that liquidated
damages are not generally disfavored but will be invalid when construed as a
penalty); Parkhurst v. Armstrong Steel Erectors, Inc., 901 F.2d 796, 798 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("Without some indication that the liquidated damages provision
is a good faith attempt to set an amount reflective of anticipated damages,
we will find the provision void as a penalty."). See generally RESTATEIMuNT
(SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (1981) (damages may be liquidated only if
certain conditions are met).
207. See, e.g., Astor v. International Business Machines Corp., 7 F.3d 533,
540 (6th Cir. 1993); Haslach v. Security Pac. Bank Oregon, 779 F. Supp.
489, 494 (D. Or. 1991); Isaacs v. Caterpillar, 702 F. Supp. 711, 713 (C.D.
111. 1988); Bunnet v. Smallwood, 793 P.2d 157, 161 (Colo. 1990). See generally
Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Recovery of Attorneys' Fees and Costs of
itigation Incurred as Result of Breach of Agreement Not to Sue, 9 A.L.R.
5th 933 (1993).
208. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975) (stating the American rule).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
ADEA WAIVERS
the breach involved a covenant not to sue. This is because the
employer who succeeds on a breach of covenant not to sue
claim is not simply a "prevailing party" seeking attorneys"
fees.20 Instead, such an employer is seeking actual damages for
the breach, and actual damages in this case are attorneys' fees
because the employer was forced to defend litigation it was not
required to defend but for the employee's breach. 210 By expressly
indicating in the agreement that damages for breach of the
covenant include attorneys' fees, 211 employers can avoid the
uncertainty of recovery.212
In addition to a breach of contract claim, employers should
consider an unjust enrichment action based on the covenant not
to sue. Under this theory, the employer argues that equity and
209. Widener, 717 F. Supp. at 1217-18 n.2. In Widener, the court stated:
The Court is not awarding Defendant its attorney's fees for
prevailing on the dismissal of Plaintiff's claims, rather the Court
finds that Defendants damages for Plaintiffs' breach of contract
is the amount of costs and attorneys' fees expended by the
Defendant in defending this lawsuit.
Id.
210. Id. at 1217. See also Anchor Motor Freight v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
700 F.2d 1067, 1072 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that damages suffered as a result
of the breach of a covenant not to sue are the costs spent in defending the
litigation, including attorneys' fees).
211. Absent such express damage provision, employers may have a claim
that they should recover attorneys' fees because the employee's breach was an
"obvious breach" or because the employee brought the claim in "bad faith."
See, e.g., Bellefonte Re Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 757 F.2d 523, 527 (2d
Cir. 1985); Artvale, Inc. v. Rugby Fabrics Corp., 363 F.2d 1002, 1008 (2d
Cir. 1966); cf. Noise Reduction, Inc. v. Nordham Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17830, at *23 n. 11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1991) (stating that the "obvious
breach" and "bad faith" standards are duplicative of the sanctions in Rule
II of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). See generally Soehnel, supra note
207 (discussing cases that applied the "obvious breach" or "bad faith"
standards).
212. Employers may also consider expressly identifying return of the con-
sideration as damage for the breach of a covenant not to sue. This option is
not recommended, however, because the return of such damages in one breach
of covenant action would invalidate the convenant with respect to future
actions by the employee against the employer. To maintain the effect of the
covenant, employers should not seek repayment of the consideration.
However, Halpern argued that counterclaims brought by employers in
response to employees' breach of covenants not to sue are valid if the employer
seeks "a return only of the additional compensation." Halpern, supra note
185, at 955. Halpern distinguished the "additional compensation," which he
sees as appropriate recovery, from litigation expenses or all severance paid to
the employees, both of which are forms of recovery that may violate public
policy. Id. As support for his position, Halpern stated: "It is only the excess,
the very essence of the now-failed bargains and exchange, which the employer
should be able to recover with its counterclaim for breach of contract." Id.
at 955-56.
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justice require the employee that violates a covenant not to sue
and retains the benefit to return the parties to the positions they
were in before the bargain. 213 Because the goal is to achieve
status quo, the proper damages for an employer to seek under
an unjust enrichment theory are the benefits paid to the em-
ployee in exchange for the covenant. 2 4 Repayment of consid-
eration under unjust enrichment differs from the tender
requirement in that employees in the former situation have to
return the consideration only after the lawsuit and only if the
employer won. This approach, therefore, avoids the "crippling
effect" of the tender requirement on an employee's efforts to
bring a lawsuit noted by some courts.215
Unjust enrichment claims, although having a sound basis in
common law,216 present problems in the present context. First,
the damages being sought - return of the consideration -
213. For cases dealing generally with the elements of unjust enrichment,
see, e.g., Eyerman v. Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc., 967 F.2d 213, 222 (6th Cir.
1992) (party retains money or benefit that in equity or justice belongs to
another); Hershey Foods Corp. v. Ralph Chapek, Inc., 828 F.2d 989, 999 (3d
Cir. 1987) (under Pennsylvania law, a wrongfully secured or passively received
benefit that would be unconscionable for a party to retain without compen-
sating the provider); Cleland v. Stadt, 670 F. Supp. 814, 816 (N.D. I11. 1987)
(when a party received benefits which, under the circumstances, would be
unjust to retain). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § I ("A
person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required
to make restitution to the other.").
214. There are apparently few published cases that address the doctrine of
unjust enrichment in the context of ADEA waivers or covenants not to sue.
In Oberg v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 11 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 1993), Allied
attempted to make an equitable argument that the employees "should not
keep all of the severance benefits it the waiver contract fails." Id. at 685.
The court held that this argument was not raised before the trial court and
was therefore waived, but indicated that "the idea has appeal." Id. Similarly,
in Noise Reduction v. Nordham Corp., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17830 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 6, 1991), the court rejected the employer's breach of contract claim
because damages were not spelled out in the contract, but the court refused
to dismiss the counterclaim because the employer may be able to prove damages
that could be awarded under their counterclaim prayer for relief seeking
recovery of "such further legal or equitable relief as this Court may deem
just and proper." Id. at *24 n.12.
Nevertheless, the court in Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 711 (C.D.
Ill. 1988) rejected the employer's (Caterpillar) unjust enrichment argument,
noting that no cases support Caterpillar's argument. Id. at 714. However,
Caterpillar was attempting to apply such argument to a defensive release rather
than a covenant not to sue. Id. For a discussion of the difference between
these types of releases, see supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
215. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1359, 1367 (C.D.
III. 1991).
216. See supra note 213 for a discussion of the common-law elements of
unjust enrichment.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol46/iss1/11
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resemble liquidated damages and may be disfavored by courts.21 7
Second, employers that lose the ADEA case on the merits cannot
succeed on an unjust enrichment theory because of "unclean
hands.1 21 Despite the unanswered questions, employers should
consider unjust enrichment actions. An unjust enrichment action
is arguably the type of claim that the Seventh Circuit alluded
to in Oberg when it stated that the employer's equitable argu-
ment had appeal, but rejected it because the employer failed to
plead the argument. 219
Finally, employees and their attorneys facing counterclaims
based on breach of contract or unjust enrichment should be
aware of the means of attacking these claims. First, employees
could argue that these actions, particularly the unjust enrichment
claims, are void as a matter of public policy. 0 Second, employer
counterclaims may be subject to a claim of retaliation by em-
ployees under the ADEA. 22' Third, employees could attack un-
apportioned consideration by arguing either that all of the money
217. See supra note 206 for a discussion of liquidated damages.
218. Essentially, it is not unjust for an employer that violates federal law
to lose their consideration paid in an attempt to avoid liability. The "unclean
hands" doctrine prohibits a party from obtaining equitable relief it they have
engaged in misconduct. See, e.g., Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automobile
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 814-15 (1945); Hocker v. New Hampshire
Ins. Co., 922 F.2d 1476, 1485-86 (10th Cir. 1991); Tarasi v. Pittsburgh Nat'l.
Bank, 555 F.2d 1152, n.9 (3d Cir. 1977). See also In re Omegas Group, Inc.,
16 F.3d 1443, 1450 n.7. (6th Cir. 1994) (noting the common-law notion that
unclean hands is an absolute bar to claims in equity).
219. The employer argued that the employee should not be able to keep all
of the severance benefits if the waiver fails. Oberg, 11 F.3d at 685.
220. Employees might argue that return of the consideration via an unjust
enrichment theory is indistinguishable from a tender requirement rejected by
several courts. A counterargument is that a tender requirement would force
employees to return the consideration before filing a lawsuit, unlike a successful
unjust enrichment claim which would require tender only upon a resolution
of the suit in favor of the employer.
Halpern disagreed with the notion that employer recovery on counterclaim
violates public policy. Halpern, supra note 185, at 953-56. Halpern concluded
his article:
The purposes for which ADEA was written include the correction
of a wrong, not the creation of a windfall for employees who
make a deal in writing and then renege. Counterclaims for breach
of contracts not to sue may be the only vehicle by which a more
balanced interpretation of ADEA will come to pass. Current case
law has failed to recognize that employers have rights too!
Id. at 969.
221. The ADEA prevents retaliation against employees who exercise their
rights under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (1988). Halpern discussed but rejected
the theory, which presently appears to be untested in the federal courts, that
counterclaims by the employer may violate the ADEA's prohibition on retal-
iation against employers. Halpern, supra note 185, at 959-68.
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was for the invalid releasem or that the covenant not to sue
was not knowing and voluntary because the employee did not
know how much money was received in exchange for the cov-
enant.223 In addition, if the employer filed an unjust enrichment
claim and the consideration was not apportioned, the employees
could argue that the employer received other benefits in exchange
for the consideration, such as improving the employer's repu-
tation and employee morale. Finally, if the employer appor-
tioned the consideration, employees could argue in some cases
that the employer discriminated in the distribution of benefits
in violation of the ADEA, ERISA, or the OWBPA. 2 4
CONCLUSION
The tender/ratification issue will affect many employees in
the United States as the number of older employees increases
and employers continue to use releases. There is presently no
uniformity in the federal courts. However, a tender requirement
should be rejected in order to protect older employees, the clear
policy behind both the ADEA and the OWBPA. In the mean-
time, there are other means for employers to protect themselves,
such as strict adherence to the OWBPA and use of covenants
not to sue. These recommendations consider the rights of em-
ployees, yet ensure protection of employers. The effective use
of waiver agreements by employers is essential to further the
ADEA's goal of private settlement.
Jill R. Bodensteiner*
222. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text for a discussion of
apportionment of consideration.
223. Cf. Seward v. B.O.C. Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 805 F. Supp. 623,
630 (N.D. Ill. 1992). In Seward, the plaintiff argued that he 'could not have
knowingly signed the waiver if he did not know that he was receiving anything
of value in exchange for his right to bring an action."' Id. at 629-30. The
court rejected this argument, stating that it would not look into the subjective
intent of the plaintiff in signing the release. Id. at 630. The court noted that
the plaintiff's "alleged mistaken belief that the Release lacked consideration
did not interfere with his comprehension of the Release's legal significance,
or consequently, his ability to knowingly sign the waiver." Id.
224. See supra notes 203-05 and accompanying text discussing such potential
arguments.
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